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Douglas Macdonald 
The Government of Canada9s Search for 
Environmental Legitimacy: 1971 - 2008 
Abstract 
Although the term "greenwash " has now entered the language, there has 
been little academic analysis of environmental legitimacy as a factor in 
environmental politics. This article examines claims to environmental 
legitimacy made by the Government of Canada with respect to seven policy 
initiatives. The most common claims have been: (I) action exceeds that of 
previous governments; (2) Canada is doing more than other countries; (3) the 
policy will aid economy as well as environment (sustainable development); 
and, (4) the transparent policy process is itself legitimate. Exaggeration and 
downplaying related action by the provinces are other common themes. 
Résumé 
Bien que le terme << écoblanchiment » soit désormais entré dans la langue, il y 
a peu d'analyses savantes sur la légitimité environnementale comme un 
facteur dans des politiques sur l'environnement. Le présent article examine 
les prétentions à la légitimité environnementale que le gouvernement du 
Canada a fait valoir dans le cadre de sept initiatives politiques et dont les plus 
communes sont les suivantes : 1) les mesures prises sont plus efficaces que 
celles des gouvernements précédents; 2) le Canada en fait plus que d'autres 
pays; 3) la politique aidera l'économie ainsi que l'environnement 
(développement durable); et 4) le processus politique transparent est légitime 
en soi. L'exagération et la minimisation des mesures connexes par les 
provinces constituent d'autres thèmes communs. 
Environmental policies implemented by Canadian federal and provincial 
governments since the early 1970s have been only partially successful. The 
most notable success has been a reduction in the harm caused by the 
discharge of industrial pollution. Acid rain caused by sulphur dioxide 
emissions from electrical utilities and smelters, for instance, has been 
significantly reduced (Environment Canada, 2003 14). More complex 
problems, however, have not been resolved. The total quantity of solid 
waste generated each year continues to increase, even though the portion of 
that total diverted to recycling has grown (64). Motor vehicles emit less 
pollution per kilometre driven, but because there are more of them, urban 
smog remains a problem (38). Despite policy efforts dating back to 1992, 
total greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase annually (21). 
The failure of government policies addressing these and other 
environmental problems can be attributed to a number of factors, including 
International Journal of Canadian Studies /Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
39-40,2009 
InternationalJournal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
the political power of the regulated industries, chronic underfunding of 
environment departments and, the subject addressed in this issue of the 
Journal, Canadian societal attitudes, such as the dominant paradigm of 
consumption and economic growth, which influence environmental 
politics. The subject of this article is one aspect of those attitudes—the 
perceived legitimacy of actions taken by the Government of Canada to 
address stich problems. This is important because to the extent that these 
actions are seen by the Canadian public as legitimate, there is less pressure 
to put in place more effective policies. Canada's federal government (like 
other governments and business corporations) devotes considerable efforts 
to convincing the public that they are taking effective action to protect the 
environment. Environmentalists refer to this as "greenwashing" 
(Greenpeace). For purposes of academic inquiry, the expression used here 
is "search for environmental legitimacy." 
I define "environmental legitimacy" as the belief in the eyes of the 
Canadian public that the values and actions of a particular actor, such as a 
government, business corporation, or individual citizen, are proper atid 
sufficient to guard against undue environmental harm. The notion will be 
discussed more fully below. As noted, this article examines one case of the 
search for environmental legitimacy—the image of its environmental 
policies presented to the public by the Government of Canada, and more 
particularly by the relevant administrative department, Environment 
Canada, since its creation in 1971. The research question is: How have the 
Government of Canada and Environment Canada worked to project to the 
Canadian public an image of environmental legitimacy? The federal 
government was selected for this case study (again, discussed more fully 
below) because it is less able than its provincial counterparts to achieve 
environmental legitimacy through policy action alone and must, therefore, 
rely more upon its ability to manipulate the image of its policy actions in the 
minds of Canadians. 
The article seeks to achieve two objectives: The first is to offer a full and 
precise definition of environmental legitimacy and to make the argument 
that the concept, thus defined, is an important aspect of Canadian 
environmental politics which deserves more research attention than it has 
received to date. The second is to attempt to make an initial contribution to 
that needed research, by analyzing the claims which one government actor 
has believed will best allow it to obtain its goal of perceived environmental 
legitimacy. 
Environmental Legitimacy 
The purpose of this section is to expand upon the brief definition of 
environmental legitimacy set out above by discussing it as a subset of the 
larger subjects of "legitimacy" and "political legitimacy." The way in 
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which social scientists conceptualize legitimacy can be seen in the two 
following definitions. 
1. "The "rightfulness" of a social or political order, its claim to 
support, as opposed to mere acquiescence, on the part of those 
subject to it... [In] twentieth-century social thought... a regime is 
"legitimate" if it is believed to be legitimate by the population 
concerned" (Outhwaite 328; emphasis in original). 
2. "Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions" (Suchman 3). 
Thus legitimacy is defined as an idea (belief, perception, assumption) in 
the mind of the person judging the legitimacy of a given entity. As can be. 
seen from the second definition, there is in fact not just one idea in that mind, 
but two. The first is the perception of the entity whose legitimacy is being 
judged (and of its actions), while the second is the perception of the standard 
(system of norms) used for that judging. This conceptualization of 
legitimacy as two ideas (the entity and the evaluative standard) in the mind 
of the legitimacy judge is central to the assumption upon which this analysis 
is based respecting the ways in which an entity, whether it be an 
organization, a social movement or an individual, can work to obtain or 
restore legitimacy in the eyes of a given audience. Based on Suchman, I 
assume that an entity can achieve legitimacy in three ways: ( 1 ) by changing 
its behaviour to better fit the standard by which its legitimacy is being 
judged by a given audience; (2) by changing the image it presents of that 
behaviour to better fit those standards; and, (3) by convincing the audience 
it should accept a change in the standards themselves, again so that there is a 
better fit between the behaviour and the standard. The focus of the case 
study which follows is on the second means, although the other two are also 
relevant to this inquiry. 
As defined here, "political legitimacy" simply applies the same 
definition to state and non-state actors (governments, political parties, 
lobbying interests) engaged in the political process. In the case of state 
actors, social scientists agree on a central point—that legitimacy is 
distinguished from coercion. Barker gives this definition: "[political] 
legitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority 
to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of 
fear or self-interest, but because subjects believe that they ought to obey" 
(11). Thus the action of obeying does not confer political legitimacy, unless 
it is motivated by more than self-interest in the face of coercive physical 
power. Such coercive power, in which the subordinate threatened with 
death complies out of self-interest, helps to explain obedience, but does not 
fully define legitimacy. That definition includes the notion of 
"rightfulness"—the belief that one should obey, even in the absence of 
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coercion. And this, of course, is why legitimacy is so directly tied to power. 
Physical force is one source of power and one means of exercising it. There 
is consensus amongst students of political power, however, ranging from 
Machiavelli to Gramsci, that a far more effective source is the willing 
consent of the governed, flowing from their perception that the power to 
which they are subjected is justified and morally acceptable, since those 
exercising it have a legitimate right to rule (Connolly; Franck; Beetham). 
Perceived legitimacy is so important in politics because it is an essential 
source of political power. 
More or less by definition, all political actors, state and non-state alike, 
seek political power. It seems reasonable to assume, then, that all seek 
legitimacy in the eyes of relevant audiences because, it is a source of 
political power and that this is equally true of actors in the arena of 
environmental politics. 
The aspect of political legitimacy relevant to this case study is less the 
legitimacy of the state as. a whole and more the perceived legitimacy of 
policies adopted by a given government. Skogstad, citing Scharpf with 
reference to "input" and "output" legitimacy, argues that both the process 
for policy development as well as the policy itself are evaluated by citizens 
or others determining legitimacy. 
Why do we obey the rules and decisions to which those in authority 
collectively bind us? The answer is clear. We obey, first, because 
we believe that those who make legally enforceable decisions have 
a right to do so; and second, because we believe the decisions 
themselves—the public policies—are socially desirable. (955) 
In the case study analysis below, I examine the ways in which the federal 
government has claimed that its policy process is legitimate (by pointing to 
such things as public consultation during policy development) as well as the 
legitimacy claims made for the policies themselves. 
Above, I offered this definition of environmental legitimacy, with 
respect to a particular judge: "the belief in the eyes of the Canadian public 
that the values and actions of a particular actor, such as a government, 
business corporation, or individual citizen, are proper and sufficient to 
guard against undue environmental harm." To further develop that, based 
on the discussion above, we can use a current definition of "greenwashing." 
Greenwashing is the unjustified appropriation of environmental 
virtue by a company, an industry, a government, a politician or 
even a non-governmental organization to create a pro-environ-
mental image, sell a product or a policy, or to try and rehabilitate 
their standing with the public and decision-makers after being 
embroiled in controversy. (Source Watch Encyclopaedia) 
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This definition sets out the possible entities being judged, their strategy for 
obtaining environmental legitimacy (appropriation, which refers to 
projecting an image, the second of the three means set out above) and two 
possible audiences doing the judging. What neither it nor my definition do 
is to explicitly present the standard being used by the relevant judging 
audience. Can we more precisely define "undue environmental harm" or 
"environmental virtue?" What follows are some preliminary suggestions. 
What we are attempting to do is to define Suchman's "socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" with respect 
to environment, in Canada and other industrialized nations today. Space 
precludes anything like a full discussion, but two points can be made. First, 
the system of environmental norms is continually changing. It did not exist 
a hundred years ago (Dryzek) and ten years ago it did not include concerns 
over bottled water and plastic shopping bags. Why does it change? The 
major impetus, throughout the twentieth century history of environmental 
concern has always been science, with the necessary addition of the social 
movement of environmentalism to broadcast and inject into the public 
debate claims made by science. Science, however, has never been the only 
driver. From the origins of the animal rights movement in the early 
nineteenth century, to more recent concerns over "land health" and 
"bioequity," values associated with justice and equity have always been 
present (Nash; Shabecoff). Second, while continually adapting in response 
to changes in science and values, at any given time there is never just one set 
of environmental norms. Instead, there is a spectrum of positions ranging 
from light (mainstream) to deep green (radical). This is because the 
environmental movement itself is divided and because other actors, in 
particular business, are now also engaged in the struggle to define 
environmental legitimacy. Social construction of environmental norms is a 
process of continual contestation. 
By far the most significant event in this evolving process has been the 
consensus which has emerged around the ambiguous concept of 
sustainable development. The modern environmental movement of the 
1960s and 1970s sought to advance two norms, both offering radical 
challenges to current values: limits to growth and bioequity (Carter). By the 
1980s, however, that radicalism was in retreat. 
In the early 1980s the environmental movement found new 
incentives, and changed its political strategies and organizational 
structure. The environmentalists of the 1980s were less radical, 
more practical, and were much more policy-oriented. The 
movement's emphases were no longer on alternatives for society, 
it started to focus on presenting practical alternatives within 
society instead. (Hajer 93) 
The most visible expression of this change was the acceptance by 
mainstream environmentalism of the set of norms represented by the 
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concept of sustainable development, which contained neither a prescription 
for limits to economic development nor a fundamental concern for the 
well-being of other species. Unable to gain legitimacy and associated 
political power as long as it maintained its original, radical norms, the 
majority environmental movement consented to the view that 
environmental protection and economic growth were not mutually 
exclusive goals. 
At the same time, business was making its own compromises. In the 
nineteenth century, Rockefeller and other barons of business saw 
themselves as functioning in an amoral market, obeying the law but 
otherwise untouched by social norms. That had changed by the 1920s, at 
which point big business, driven by a search for legitimacy, had agreed that 
it bore social responsibilities, most notably to its employees, customers and 
neighbours (Mitchell, 1989; 1997). During the counter-culture era of the 
1960s, business lost legitimacy on a number of fronts, including the new 
one of the environment. Since then, it has worked to gain environmental 
legitimacy, using all three strategies: improving its environmental 
management; engaging in advertising and public relations efforts to project 
a positive image of that behaviour change (Howlett and Raglon); and 
working to change the norms by which it was being judged, particularly by 
embracing the new norm of sustainable development (Macdonald, 2007). 
Both environmentalists and business have sought environmental 
legitimacy and have worked to obtain it through compromise, in the process 
establishing sustainable development as the central norm of environmental 
legitimacy (Hajer; Lafferty). As we shall see, the Government of Canada 
has also contributed to that process as part of its search for environmental 
legitimacy. . 
Environmental Legitimacy Claims 
Since its creation, Environment Canada has faced a basic problem 
concerning its environmental legitimacy. This is due to the fact that 
governmental power to protect the environment is largely held by others, 
meaning that it is less able to obtain environmental legitimacy through its 
actions and must rely more upon its portrayal of those actions to the 
Canadian public. In the first sentence of their study of the department, 
Doern and Conway describe the problem this way: "The Department of the 
Environment (DOE) is the focal point for the analysis in this book, but the 
department has not been, as we will see, the centre of political power on 
environmental matters" (16). The power of the department to take policy 
action has always been limited by two factors: (1) its weak position within 
the Government of Canada; and (2) the fact that it has been almost 
exclusively the provinces, rather than the federal government, who have 
regulated pollution using the coercive, effective instrument of law. 
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The first problem stems from the fact that, because environment is a 
"horizontal issue" touching upon almost all aspects of the Canadian 
economy and society, the actions of many other federal government 
departments, in fields such as resources, industry, health and agriculture, 
are as necessary and relevant as its own (Macdonald, 1991 ; Winfield). The 
department has never been given any real powers to co-ordinate the 
environmental activities of other federal departments or agencies (Doern 
and Conway; Doern). During the Chrétien era, responsibility for the most 
salient issue, climate change, was divided between Environment Canada 
and Natural Resources Canada, with the latter only established as lead 
department under the Martin government (Macdonald, Bjorn and 
VanNijnatten). Since its creation, this internal weakness has been 
compounded by the fact that, with a few exceptions (Charles Caccia in the 
Trudeau government of the early 1980s, Lucien Bouchard, briefly after the 
1988 re-election of the Mulroney government, David Anderson in the 
Chrétien government from 1999 to 2003, John Baird and Jim Prentice in the 
Harper government), Environment Canada has almost always been a 
relatively small department, headed by ministers who were newly elected 
MPs, with no particular interest or expertise in the area of the environment, 
and who often were shuffled out of the post after only a few months in the 
job (Doern and Conway). 
Secondly, due in part to constitutional jurisdiction and in part to the 
evolution of federal-provincial co-ordination in the field, the process of 
environmental regulation through setting and enforcing standards, is done 
almost completely by provincial environment departments, using 
provincial law (Cotton and McKinnon). Environment Canada has rarely 
used federal law to directly regulate polluting firms. 
In the 1970s, Environment Canada used its powers under the newly 
enacted federal environmental legislation to directly regulate pollution 
emissions of a limited number of private sector firms, most notably in the 
pulp and paper sector. As the provinces began to establish their own 
regulatory systems, and to object to what they saw as federal intrusion, this 
direct regulatory role was reduced. In the late 1980s, responding to the 
renewed salience of environment as a political and electoral issue, the 
Mulroney administration, having successfully co-ordinated the 1985 
national acid rain program, began to seek the electoral benefits associated 
with a stronger policy role (Harrison). The Mulroney government enacted 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) in 1988, but since then 
it has been used primarily to regulate toxic substances as products sold on 
the market, rather than pollution emissions. The 1990 Green Plan, however, 
in part due to objections by the provinces, contained no regulatory 
provisions and during the 1990s the Chrétien government moved to 
harmonize policy with the provinces, recognizing their primary regulatory 
role (Winfield and Macdonald). The one exception in the history of leaving 
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emissions regulation to the provinces has been climate change policy. Since 
2002, when Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the federal government has 
been developing plans to itself directly regulate greenhouse gas emissions; 
regulations under CEPA were slated to take effect in 2010, but have been 
delayed in order to harmonize with pending US regulation (Galloway). At 
the time of ratification, no provincial regulations were in place. These three 
times that the federal government moved to more actively implement 
environmental policy, in the early 1970s, late 1980s and 2007, were 
attempts to gain environmental legitimacy, and associated electoral 
advantage, by the first means discussed above, behaviour change. They 
were half-hearted, though, and never replaced primary reliance upon the 
second method, image projection. 
Given these two constraints, the focus of the present case study is the way 
in which Environment Canada, and through it the Government of Canada, 
have sought to compensate, by means of image projection, for a lack of 
action to achieve environmental legitimacy in the eyes of the Canadian 
public. Examination is made of the image of its actions projected by the 
department, first in general terms in 1974, and then with respect to seven 
major policy initiatives: (1) the 1985 acid rain program; (2) the enactment 
ofCEPAin 1988;(3)the 1990 Green Plan; (4) the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA) of 1992; (5) the participation in the international 
Rio conference of 1992 which resulted in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity; (6) the 
climate change policy adopted by the Chrétien government in 2002, the first 
time the federal government acted independently of the provinces on the 
issue; and (7) the 2007 Harper government climate change program, also 
unilatéral, but this time more clearly forced upon a reluctant government by 
public opinion (Macdonald, 2008). Although far from being a complete 
survey of Environment Canada policies, these seven policy initiatives do 
provide a useful sample which includes both instances when federal 
regulation was either absent or less important for the program in question 
than provincial regulation (the Green Plan and acid rain) and, at the other 
end of the spectrum, instances when the program in question was anchored 
to direct federal regulation (CEPA, CEAA, the 2002 and 2007 federal 
climate change programs). The one example of action on the international 
stage (Rio) gives a snapshot of an area in which the federal government is 
less constrained by the provinces. 
Actions taken by the department with respect to each of these initiatives 
are briefly described, followed by a description and discussion of the way in 
which Environment Canada or the Government of Canada presented those 
actions to the Canadian public. Data respecting those claims to 
environmental legitimacy is taken from twelve documents. The 1974 docu-
ment is a government report, while all the others are speeches or statements 
by the environment minister or prime minister of the day, or news releases. 
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Again, with the exception of the 1974 document, all are short documents, on 
average two to five pages, making identification of the major claims made 
in each a relatively straight-forward task. The "claim" is defined here as 
words used to describe: (1) the government itself (for instance, concerned 
about the environment); (2) the policy process (for instance, transparent, 
consultative); and (3) the policy itself (for instance, more significant than 
anything done by previous governments. Unlike technical documents, 
these speeches and news releases are intended solely to give the public a 
positive view of their government and so are a useful source of data 
respecting environmental legitimacy claims. 
Three years after it came into being, Environment Canada published a 
short document titled Environment Canada: Its role, goals and 
organization. It is a sober, straightforward document which appears to 
provide a factual picture, without embellishment or exaggeration. The 
departmental mandate is presented as follows: "The Department of the 
Environment, also known as Environment Canada, has as its primary duty 
the protection of Canada's air, water and land resources" (Environment 
Canada, 1974 2). The limited regulatory capacity of the department is 
readily admitted: "Regulation and use [of resources] are largely under 
provincial jurisdiction" (4). The document claims that a "useful division of 
labour" between the two levels of government has been established and 
goes on to present one of the dominant, recurring themes in the documents 
examined: co-operation. "It is clear that environmental matters do not fall 
under separate federal and provincial headings. Co-operation is the key 
word in concept, planning and execution. This parallels the reality that the 
human environment is one and indivisible" (4). 
Given this limited role, what claim does the document make for the 
legitimacy of the department's role? The answer is another recurring theme: 
leadership. "Although Environment Canada cannot accomplish on its own 
the renewable resource and environmental tasks for these important 
national undertakings, it can provide leadership" (6). More specifically, 
with respect to regulation and enforcement of environmental laws (defined 
above as the use of an effective, coercive policy instrument), the document 
states that while the provinces are expected to take the lead, the federal 
government will act if necessary, "[b]ut the federal government must act 
directly, where it has jurisdiction, if the provinces are unable or fail to 
provide adequate protection. With cooperation and experience, direct 
federal action will be the exception" (6). 
The 1985 Acid Rain Program 
By the late 1970s, acid rain, consisting of sulphur dioxide emitted by 
coal-burning smelters and utilities in both Canada and the US and nitrogen 
oxides in motor vehicle exhaust, was becoming the department's dominant 
concern. Between then and the conclusion of the 1991 Canada-US Air 
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Quality Agreement, the federal government played a two-level game: 
trying to convince both the Americans and the seven most eastern Canadian 
provinces to put in place more effective policy. Although Environment 
Canada threatened to directly regulate emissions as part of its negotiations 
with the Ontario Ministry of Environment, at the end of the day, the 1985 
federal-provincial program relied upon the provinces for that task. The 
federal government was charged with developing new standards for motor 
vehicle emissions and providing funding to assist with smelter 
modernization and emission reduction. The heart of the program, however, 
was action by the provinces, using the instrument of law, coupled in 
Ontario's case with an active enforcement program (Macdonald, 1997). 
In two documents describing that program, a news release and a speech 
by the minister, the modesty and unadorned prose of the 1974 document is 
replaced by triumphalism. The "truly ambitious national acid rain 
program" is the "largest and most essential environmental program that 
Canadahas ever witnessed" (Environment Canada, 1985). Itmeans Canada 
is playing a "leadership role in the international community." The program 
shows how the newly elected Mulroney government has "demonstrated its 
concern for environmental protection in Canada." The minister's speech 
goes even further than the news release. Another recurring theme, the claim 
that the Canadian federal government is doing more than governments of 
other countries, appears: "[the program] will have the effect of placing 
Canada in the lead among the countries engaged in eliminating this 
problem... .Our new motor emission standards are as tough as any other 
national standard and tougher than most" (Blais-Grenier). The phrase "as 
tough as" was necessary because the standards were simply based on US 
federal standards. We not only have the usual claim of cooperation, but now 
"an unparalleled example of cooperation" (Blais-Grenier). The super-
latives continue: "The scientific investigation and monitoring program is 
the most comprehensive long-term effort by Canada in the environmental 
field.... In short, it is the most ambitious environmental protection program 
even [sic] put foreward [sic] and one that is not equaled anywhere." 
These two 1985 acid rain documents, in summary, provided four claims 
to environmental legitimacy: (1) the federal government was concerned 
about the issue of environmental protection and giving it priority; (2) the 
program was a major step forward, showing that this government was doing 
more than its predecessors; (3) the federal government was playing a 
leadership role; and (4) Canadian action compared favourably with that of 
other countries. In addition, although the provincial role was acknowledged, 
it was certainly not highlighted. The news release referred to "emission 
reductions to be achieved under provincial legislation" but only after 
describing the program's "tough new [federal] motor vehicle emission 
standards" (Environment Canada, March 6,1985). 
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The 1988 Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) 
The 1988 CEPA consolidated a number of existing federal laws, but did not 
significantly expand the federal government's legislative scope. CEPA did, 
however, increase the upper limit on fines under federal environmental law, 
something which was proudly pointed to by the minister of the day. In his 
speech introducing the new CEPA to the House of Commons for first 
reading, Tom McMillan stated: "Like the Draft Bill, the revised Act sets out 
$1 million-a-day fines against polluters, no maximum fines for certain 
offences—so-called crimes against the environment—and jail terms of up 
to five years... [and] corporate chief executive officers will be held legally 
accountable" (McMillan). It notes that during the preceding decade, there 
had not been a single federal government prosecution under the preceding 
legislation and that "the country's record in enforcing environmental law 
has been appalling" (McMillan). What the speech does not do is refer to the 
basic fact laid out in the 1974 document discussed above, that regulation 
and enforcement through prosecutions in the Canadian system is done by 
the provinces, with federal regulation being the exception. In the ten years 
from 1988 to 1998, the federal government prosecuted 232 infractions, 
while one province, Ontario, laid 13,229 charges (Mittelstaedt). It is true 
that CEPA provided for coercive enforcement, but the federal government 
has never really used the potential powers highlighted by the minister at the 
time. 
A companion document by Environment Canada, undated but likely 
from 1987 since the title refers to the "proposed" Act, made as its major 
claim that CEPA would provide "the legislative framework for the better 
management of chemicals ... from research and development to introduc-
tion, through manufacture, transportation, distribution, use and, ultimately, 
to disposal." Although in more muted language, it too highlighted the 
million-dollars-per-day fines, and in addition federal "leadership" and 
"regulations ... applicable to federal lands." The primary claim for 
environmental legitimacy made in these two documents is the exaggerated 
statement that the federal government is tough on environmental crime. 
The others are the same as those made in 1985— moving forward in a way 
not done by previous governments and providing leadership. 
The 1990 Green Plan 
Following the 1988 election, which resulted in the re-election of the 
Mulroney government, Lucien Bouchard became the first Environment 
Canada Minister who clearly had the ear of the prime minister. Shortly 
afterward, he left the government to establish the Bloc Québécois and went 
on to fight the 1995 referendum. "A close friend of the prime minister 
... [Bouchard] strode into the DOE [Department of Environment] knowing 
he had a prime-ministerial mandate to devise a Green Plan and he set about 
doing so" (Doern and Conway 49). The plan relied primarily upon the 
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policy instrument of spending (three billion dollars over five years), rather 
than regulation. Most of that money was never spent, however. $1.2 billion 
was cut by the Mulroney government in the 1991 and 1992 budgets (78) and 
the plan was then cancelled by the Liberals after they came to power in 
1993. In retrospect, it is clear that the plan was far closer to a pure public 
relations exercise than were any of the previously discussed policy actions. 
What follows is the identification of the claims for environmental 
legitimacy made in the "Statement by the Prime Minister" and "Statement 
by the Minister of the Environment," provided as prefaces to the Green Plan 
(Government of Canada, 1990). Fourmajor claims were made: (1) the need 
to integrate economic and environmental decision making, associated with 
the emergence of the sustainable development paradigm (a new theme); (2) 
the need to co-operate with a new stress upon co-operation with individual 
Canadians; (3) the plan was a significant step forward; and, (4) the process 
by which the plan was developed was legitimate because it was transparent 
and consultative. 
After referring to the historical importance of the Canadian environment 
and natural resources, the brief prime minister's message (about 200 words) 
stated: "The challenge we now face is to build upon our economic strengths 
in harmony with our environment..." (Government of Canada, 1990 1). 
The prime minister's statement ends with "The Green Plan will help 
Canada be a country which is both economically prosperous and environ-
mentally healthy" ( 1 ). For the first time, we find federal government action 
presented in the context of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development is described, in general, as activity in 
which the environment is fully incorporated into the economic 
decision-making process as a forethought, not an afterthought.... 
We Canadians know from our own experience that economic 
growth is essential... [there must be] a fundamental change in the 
way we use the environment in our pursuit of economic growth. 
(Government of Canada, 1990 4-5) 
The second theme in the prime minister's statement is co-operation with 
individual citizens: "Every Canadian has a role to play in achieving this 
goal of sustainable development" (Government of Canada, 1990 1). The 
statement emphasizes the "Government's commitment to work with 
Canadians" (1). The minister's statement refers to co-operation with 
individual Canadians. Thirdly, the statement refers to the fact that the plan 
"was developed in consultation with Canadians from all walks of life" ( 1 ). 
In the minister's statement, we find the familiar claim that it was a 
significant step forward, in fact the most significant to that date, the "most 
important environmental action plan ever produced in Canada" (2). The 
claim of process legitimacy resulting from consultation was made several 
times. The minister stated that he had spent the "past summer... listening to 
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Canadians" and pointed to the fact that "400 of the 500 recommendations" 
made at the final consultation session had been included in the plan (2). 
The 1992 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
Environmental assessment is the process used to predict the environmental 
impacts of a project during its planning stages and then design the project in 
order to minimize those impacts. During the 1970s, most provinces enacted 
environmental assessment laws, while the federal government relied upon 
non-legislative policy for assessment of projects under federal jurisdiction. 
Only when forced by court actions, did the federal government enact a law 
(Boyd 151). 
The speech by the Minister, Robert de Cotret, on the day he presented the 
draft Canadian Environmental Assessment Act to the House of Commons 
made four claims to environmental legitimacy: (1) the government was 
committed to act on the issue; (2) the bill was a significant step forward, 
more important than anything done in the area to date by his or previous 
governments; (3) the process for developing the CËAA was consultative, as 
would be the environmental assessment process itself under the Act; and, 
(4) the bill would place Canada in a position of world leadership. The first 
page of the speech advances the first two claims—"this Government is 
committed to action ... These initiatives are a major step forward ... 
[providing] an "improved... process." Relative to the third claim, the bulk 
of the speech described the environmental assessment for projects under 
federal jurisdiction, emphasizing its accessibility and transparency. While 
the closing paragraphs refer to the "inputs from two years of extensive 
consultations" during the development of the act, the fourth claim is 
summarized in the following: "I want to point out that Canada is among the 
first nations in the world to implement environmental assessment of policy 
[as opposed to physical projects]." Boyd (151) refers to the minister's 
comments as "hyperbole." 
the 1992 Rio Conference 
Canada's participation in the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Sustainable Development, unlike the other five policy 
initiatives examined here, is an instance of Canadian environmental foreign 
policy. This is significant because in foreign policy the federal government 
plays the dominant role, albeit with a need to consult the provinces, thus 
avoiding the basic problem of limited capacity for action found in domestic 
regulations. Two documents were used to obtain examples of the image 
presented by the Government of Canada at this particular moment on the 
world stage—the "National Statement" to the conference made by the 
Minister of Environment, Jean Charest, on June 11,1992 and an address to 
the conference by Prime Minister Mulroney the next day. 
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In those two documents, we find five claims to environmental 
legitimacy, all of them by now familiar: (1) the sustainable development 
argument that policy will benefit the economy as well as the environment; 
(2) leadership; (3) co-operation; (4) process legitimacy; and, (5) 
comparisons with other countries. The minister's national statement 
referred almost immediately to the work of the World Commission on the 
Environment and Development, chaired by Gro Brundtland, and pointed to 
the fact that "Canada was one of four countries" visited by the Commission 
during its research (Charest 2). The 1990 Green Plan was then presented as 
"an action plan for sustainable development" (2) The closing words of the 
statement were a call to "build a world of sustainable development" (7). 
The prime minister stated that "sustainable development is not a slogan; it is 
a prerequisite of our prosperity and a safeguard of our identity" and also that 
"[t]he reconciliation of economic development and environmental 
preservation is not only necessary, it is inescapable" (Mulroney 1). 
Both statements repeatedly referred to leadership, by calling upon the 
nations represented at Rio to take leadership action and by proudly pointing 
to that already taken by the Government of Canada. The minister explicitly 
stated that the ability to lead flowed from the legitimacy associated with 
sustainable development. "Governments as trustees must lead. To lead 
effectively, they must have the moral authority to do so. The challenge to 
governments everywhere in this complex, interrelated and rapidly 
changing world is to take the decisions which put us on the path to 
sustainable development.... In Canada we have acted" (Charest 3). 
The minister made his co-operation claim by stating that his government 
had "reached out to all sectors of Canadian society" (2). In terms of the 
fourth claim, the minister said: "The foundation of Canada's Green Plan has 
been transparency, accountability and inclusion" (2). These three elements 
were repeated in the speech and then again in the conclusion, in which the 
minister said that peoples of the world will hold leaders accountable for the 
Rio decisions, will expect to be included in those decisions, and that the Rio 
process must be transparent (7). Finally, the fifth claim was made by the 
prime minister, when he referred to the recently concluded Canada-US Air 
Quality Agreement as "one of the most significant bilateral environmental 
agreements between any two countries in recent years" (Mulroney 1992). 
The 2002 Climate Change Plan 
For the ten years following the Rio conference, the federal and provincial 
governments worked together to develop national climate change policy. In 
the face of strong resistance by industry and oil-producing provinces such 
as Alberta, only the relatively toothless policy instrument of appeals for 
voluntary action was used (Simpson, et al.; Macdonald). Since those 
provinces were unwilling to participate in national policy making once the 
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Chrétien government decided in 2002 to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the 
federal government proceeded to develop its own policy. The 2002 plan 
announced in November (Government of Canada, 2002) relied primarily 
upon two instruments, spending and "covenants" with large greenhouse 
gas emitting firms, a type of contract, and thus closer to regulatory action 
than the previous voluntary program. 
Speaking in the House of Commons to lead off the debate on ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the minister of the day, David Anderson, made four 
claims. The first, stressed repeatedly in the speech, was the way in which the 
plan would engender co-operation amongst all relevant actors: "We have 
worked closely with other partners, both at home and abroad.. ."(Anderson 
1 )" He referred to "our determination to build a consensus" (2) and said that 
"[f]rom the beginning of this process, we have sought to develop a 
collaborative relationship with many Canadian partners ..." (4), referring 
to provinces and territories, industry, labour and municipalities. The claim 
of co-operation with the provinces is a clear case of exaggeration, given the 
fact that his government's decision to ratify had brought an end to the 
federal-provincial process. Secondly, the speech claimed process 
legitimacy from consultations to plan development. Thirdly, it pointed to 
leadership : "I want to discuss the leadership that Canada is showing at home 
and internationally... " ( 1 ). This claim is very much an exaggeration, given 
the failure of Canadian policy to that date. Finally, although far from being 
the dominant theme, which was very much co-operation, reference is made 
to the sustainable development theme of a "robust economy and an 
environment that we could enjoy, too" (6). Despite the fact that his 
government was moving to regulate industry, the word did not appear in the 
speech. Instead, the minister said: "Industry will be asked for no more than 
55 MT in reductions" (6). 
The 2007 Climate Change Plan 
By the time the Liberal Martin government fell in late 2006, it had published 
regulatory requirements for industrial reductions in the Canada Gazette, 
under the authority of CEP A. In 2006, the Harper government extended the 
deadlines for industry compliance, but in the face of rising concerns over 
the issue registered in public opinion polls, it was forced to replace both its 
original plan and the minister (Macdonald, 2008). In the spring of 2007, the 
Harper government announced its second plan. That plan was essentially a 
continuation of previous Liberal policy (Macdonald, 2008). The 
accompanying news release, however, is in sharp contrast to Minister 
Anderson's 2002 speech. The first sentence contained two claims—being 
tough on environmental crime and taking more significant action than 
previous governments: "the federal government [will] for the first-time 
ever force industry to reduce greenhouse gases and air pollution" 
(Environment Canada, 2007 1). Given the regulatory action of the Martin 
government, the latter claim is at best an exaggeration and at worst not true. 
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The third claim was that this plan exceeded that of other countries: "Canada 
now has one of the most aggressive plans to tackle greenhouse gases and air 
pollution in the world" (1). This too is an exaggeration, given the fact that 
Canada is the only signatory country to have explicitly abandoned the 
reduction target it accepted in the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, the sustainable 
development theme is referred to: "These tough industrial regulations ... 
will have many positive economic effects" (1). The dominant claim, 
however, like that in the 1988 CEPA speech, was tough on environmental 
crime. 
Conclusion 
The table below lists the claims identified above with respect to the seven 
policy actions examined. 
' Table 1. Environmental legitimacy claims 1985-2007 
Program 
1985 acid rain 
1 1988 CEPA 
1990 Green Plan 
1992 Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act 
1992 Rio Conference 
2002 climate change 
2007 climate change 
Claims 
. concerned 
. exceeds previous governments 
. leadership 
. exceeds other countries 
. tough on environmental crime 
. exceeds previous governments 
. leadership 
. sustainable development 
. co-operation 
. exceeds previous governments 
. process 
. concerned 
. process (both to develop and EA itself) 
. exceeds previous governments 
. exceeds other countries 
. sustainable development 
. leadership 
. co-operation 
. process 
. exceeds other countries 
. co-operation 
. leadership 
. process 
. sustainable development 
. tough on environmental crime 
. exceeds previous governments 
. exceeds other countries 
. sustainable development || 
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The frequency of these eight claims, from most to least, is as follows. 
• exceeds previous governments 6 
• exceeds other countries 4 
• sustainable development 4 
• process 4 
• leadership 3 
• co-operation 3 
• concerned 2 
The central question explored here—How has the federal government 
worked to project an image of environmental legitimacy!—concerns the 
second of the three means of obtaining legitimacy discussed above. 
Conclusions in answer to that question are provided here, followed by a 
brief discussion of the other two means, changing behaviour and attempting 
to change the relevant norms. 
In the instances examined here, the federal government has used three 
major strategies to present itself, its policies and the relevant policy 
development process as being environmentally legitimate. The most 
common strategy was to draw a favourable comparison, either with other 
governments or with other countries. Particularly in terms of the former, 
this is an application of the normal methods of partisan politics in the new 
arena of environmental policy, and as such is hardly surprising. Secondly, 
we find that the federal government has compensated for its regulatory 
inactivity in two ways: it has downplayed the role of provincial regulations 
(for instance, with respect to the national acid rain program or the 
non-regulatory Green Plan); and it has exaggerated the importance of direct 
federal regulation when it did occur (for instance, motor vehicle standards 
for acid rain, CEPA, and the Harper government 2007 climate regulations). 
Thirdly, as noted, legitimacy claims were almost always based upon 
exaggeration and hyperbole. The misleading statement by the Harper 
government that it would "for the first-time ever force industry to reduce 
greenhouse gases" (Environment Canada, 2007 1) is an extreme version, 
but the same tendency to shade the truth was found throughout. Again not 
too surprisingly, the federal government has engaged in greenwashing as 
part of its search for environmental legitimacy. 
What are the implications of these methods of image projection? It seems 
likely that they have contributed to the environmental policy failures 
referred to at the outset. We lack empirical data on the success of this 
claims-making activity—the extent to which the voting public since 1985 
has believed that its federal government was in fact a legitimate actor, 
putting in place effective policy. To the extent that they did, however, 
pressure on the federal government to take effective action was dulled. 
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What about the times the federal government has also used the first of the 
three strategies and changed its own behaviour? It seems clear that such 
things as the Mulroney government activism of the late 1980s (Harrison) 
and the Harper redirection of climate change policy back to more stringent 
regulation (Macdonald, 2008) were prompted by rising levels of public 
concern. This behaviour change, however, largely provided ammunition 
for the second strategy of image projection. The Mulroney government's 
Green Plan certainly contributed to that government's environmental 
legitimacy image, but accomplished little. Similarly, the Harper 
government solved its environmental legitimacy deficit, but at the end of 
the day, the policy itself was only a return to that of its predecessor. Because 
they were able to obtain the needed environmental legitimacy as much by 
image as by action, we find that even when the first strategy was used, 
policy effectiveness was dulled. 
Finally, we must say a word about the third strategy. It is very clear that 
after the early 1990s, the federal government eagerly contributed to the 
construction of the new environmental norm of environmental protection 
coupled with economic growth, purely for anthropocentric reasons. Here, 
perhaps, is the true importance of environmental legitimacy as a factor in 
environmental politics. By joining business and environmentalists at the 
new centre of mainstream environmental politics, the federal government 
helped to preclude fundamental change in the arc of capitalist development. 
The search for environmental legitimacy is an important component of 
societal attitudes which influence environmental politics. 
Note 
* This paper was originally titled "Giving the Appearance of Action: Government 
Rhetoric Respecting its Environmental Regulation, 1970-2007" delivered at the 
conference Canada Exposed/he Canada à découvert, International Conference 
on Canadian Studies, May 28,2008. 
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